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Abstract: Collective action among resource users has long been identified as a 
basic element of successful common pool governance, and one of the main concerns 
of common pool research is the identification of factors that affect collective 
action. Among the most commonly identified factors are trust, social capital, 
common preferences, shared knowledge, collaborative experiences, focusing 
events and expectations of future interactions. Thus far, however, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the historical-institutional context of collective action 
and the constraining effects of path dependency. Path dependency suggests that 
investments and adaptations in early resource management institutions can make 
it difficult for actors to abandon these institutions, thereby influencing and shaping 
subsequent collective action efforts. This article examines the impact that path 
dependency can have on collective action in common pools, by examining basin-
level water management in the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia, the Colorado 
Basin of the US and the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin of Canada. In all three cases, 
early water apportionment institutions have proven strongly path dependent, 
significantly shaping subsequent collective action efforts at water conservation.
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1. Introduction
Collective action among resource users has long been identified as a basic element 
of successful common pool governance, and one of the main concerns of common 
pool research is the identification of factors that affect collective action. Among the 
most commonly identified factors are trust, social capital, common preferences, 
shared knowledge, collaborative experiences, focusing events and expectations of 
future interactions. Thus far, however, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the historical-institutional context of collective action and the constraining effects 
of path dependency. Path dependency suggests that investments and adaptations 
in early resource management institutions can make it difficult for actors to 
abandon these institutions, thereby influencing and shaping subsequent collective 
action efforts. This article examines the impact that path dependency can have on 
collective action in common pools, suggesting that it should be added to the list 
of factors outlined above.
To explore this assertion, this paper offers a longitudinal comparison of 
basin-wide collective action in the governance of water resources in the Murray-
Darling Basin of Australia, the Colorado Basin of the United States, and the 
Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin of Canada. These cases have been selected using a 
‘most different’ comparative approach which attempts to show the ‘apportionment 
to conservation’ development path in different cases from different parts of the 
world. This demonstrates the importance of path dependency in contrasting 
settings, suggesting its general relevance to analyses of collective action in 
common pool governance. In all cases, collective action is examined at the 
basin level, between sub-national governments and, less often, within national 
governments. Since there is no ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ collective action situation in 
common pool governance, this focus on large-scale basin level collective action 
is meant to be illustrative rather than representative and was done primarily for 
ease of data collection. Given the paper’s historical/longitudinal approach, the 
main sources of data were previous academic studies and government documents, 
all of which were analysed using qualitative content analysis, and triangulated to 
ensure the accuracy of findings.
The paper proceeds in three sections below. The first section describes 
the concept of path dependency in some detail and makes the case that path 
dependency is important for understanding contemporary collective action. 
Section two illustrates the relevance and influence of path dependency on basin 
level collective action in the Murray-Darling, Colorado, and Saskatchewan-Nelson 
basins, respectively. Section three then offers some concluding observations and 
suggestions for further work in this area.
2. Common pool governance institutions and path dependency
In semi-arid regions, river basins are the lifeblood of local economies, many of 
which were originally based on mining and/or agricultural irrigation, both water-
intensive activities. To facilitate economic development, early water management 
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efforts were geared primarily toward the claiming and distribution of water 
entitlements, allowing miners, irrigators and other water users to attain secure 
resource flows. In the early stages of development, the river basins were so large, 
and the demands on them so small, that the conservation of resource stocks was 
not really a concern. As a result, the early institutions of water management 
in most semi-arid river basins were designed to facilitate the appropriation of 
water flows, not the conservation of water stocks. This was true at all levels of 
governance, including the basin level where the riparian governments sharing a 
river basin typically negotiated, and in some cases litigated, water apportionment 
institutions to divide the waters amongst themselves.
Apportionment institutions are characterised by rules that establish a division 
of resource flows, often at multiple, nested levels. In semi-arid river basins, for 
instance, intergovernmental apportionment agreements divide water into state/
provincial shares, allowing the riparian governments to divide their respective 
shares amongst individual, collective, or corporate water users in the form of 
licenses or water rights. The underlying objective of apportionment institutions 
is to provide governments and resource users with some certainty of resource 
flows – notwithstanding natural variability – so they can develop their resources 
without fear of encroachment by others. Examples of basin-wide apportionment 
institutions include the River Murray Waters Agreement (1914) in south-eastern 
Australia, the Master Apportionment Agreement (1969) on the Canadian prairies, 
and a variety of apportionment agreements in the American West, including the 
Colorado River Compact (1922). All three of these examples are explored in more 
detail below.
In most cases, the early apportionment institutions proved quite successful 
in attaining their underlying economic development objectives, but had the 
long-term, unintended effect of contributing to the degradation of water stocks 
through overuse. Over the last few decades, governments have responded 
to these problems with efforts to develop conservation institutions aimed at 
achieving basin-wide stock restoration or preservation objectives. One of the key 
distinguishing features of conservation institutions is their emphasis on limiting 
water diversions and consumption throughout an entire basin. This is an explicit 
recognition that all water uses in a basin are interdependent and that all of these 
activities should be regulated so the water stock can be preserved or restored. 
In this way, the underlying objective of conservation institutions is sustainable 
development, though it is certainly questionable whether many of them actually 
succeed in achieving this goal. One of the best examples of a water conservation 
institution is the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions (1995) in south-eastern 
Australia, explored in greater detail below.
The historical fact that apportionment institutions preceded conservation 
efforts in many semi-arid river basins is important because it means that the actors 
undertaking conservation efforts did not start with an institutional blank slate, 
as is often assumed in analyses of collective action. The existing literature on 
common pools and resource governance points to a number of factors that affect 
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actors’ capacity for collective action, including trust, common preferences, shared 
knowledge, collaborative experiences, focusing events and expectations of future 
interactions (Gerlak and Heikkila 2007; Ostrom 1990; Raymond 2006; Singleton 
1998; Singleton and Taylor 1992). While all of these are clearly important, so 
is the historical-institutional context in which collective action occurs. The 
‘apportionment to conservation’ development path is by no means unique to the 
governance of semi-arid river basins. In many fisheries, forests, and wild animal 
stocks, early collective action efforts were dedicated to apportionment in various 
forms and these apportionment institutions have persisted to shape and constrain 
more recent efforts at resource conservation. In short, path dependency is an 
under-explored variable in the governance of common pools of various types and 
is probably deserving of greater emphasis in common pool analysis.
The use of path dependency as an explanatory variable implies an historical 
approach to analysis that emphasises the importance of the order in which 
things happen. However, path dependency is not about historical determinism 
or inevitability, but is instead about “context-bound rationality:” past events and 
choices establish constraints and incentives that narrow future choice sets (Kay 
2005, 564). In other words, the sequencing of events is crucial because early 
events alter the context of future decision-making, pre-empting some options 
and making other options more or less attractive (Pierson 2004, 18–19). Thus, 
it matters that apportionment institutions were introduced well before efforts 
at resource conservation because the pre-existence of these apportionment 
institutions constrains the decision options available to actors involved in 
conservation issues.
Institutions become path dependent and constrain future choice sets when they 
provide “positive feedback” to the actors subject to them. This positive feedback 
often relates to adaptations and investments that actors have made in an institution 
and are reluctant to abandon, notwithstanding the institution’s economic, social 
or environmental effects. North (1990) has pointed out that there are usually 
steep transaction costs and learning costs involved in major institutional change 
and actors may be very reluctant to abandon investments in and adaptations to 
existing institutions, providing positive feedback that helps to perpetuate status 
quo institutions. The longer an institution exists, the greater are the investments 
and adaptations in the institution, and the more difficult it is to undertake major 
institutional change (Pierson 2004, 22–23). Positive feedback helps to explain 
the long-term persistence of many institutions, particularly those institutions 
that appear to be anachronistic or socially dysfunctional. In the cases analysed 
here, positive feedback helps to explain why apportionment institutions remain 
the centrepiece of water governance in semi-arid river basins today, despite the 
pressing urgency of conservation issues.
Positive feedback constrains actor decision-making because it provides 
positive reinforcement for the institutional status quo compared to potential reform 
options, prompting actors to forgo major institutional reform. When this calculus 
is repeated over time, institutions providing positive feedback tend to remain on 
Path dependency and collective action in common pool governance  135
a relatively constant trajectory (or path), the selection of which is dependent on 
choices made early in the process of institutional development (Pierson 2004, 21). 
So, the early historical decision to create apportionment institutions continues 
to have a major influence on current decision-making because positive feedback 
from these institutions makes it extremely difficult to abandon or reform them to 
achieve conservation goals, resulting in path dependent resource management. 
Thus, the current collective action challenges of water conservation are historically 
rooted in apportionment and should be understood as such.
As noted above, whether an institution is path dependent or not depends 
largely on its capacity to provide positive feedback to key political actors. 
Summarising the burgeoning path dependency literature, Kay (2005, 562–563) 
has catalogued a variety of sources of positive feedback that can contribute to path 
dependency. Among these, the most relevant sources of positive feedback from 
early apportionment institutions has been the entrenchment of vested interests, the 
onset of network effects, the investment of sunk costs, and the creation of formal 
or informal contracts. Together, they have combined to make apportionment 
institutions in semi-arid river basins politically resilient, perpetuating them and 
constraining conservation efforts. The nature of each of these sources of positive 
feedback is described below:
1. Vested interests – By design, apportionment institutions create vested interests 
at a variety of governance levels. The purpose of apportionment institutions 
is to provide governments and, ultimately, water users with relatively secure 
shares of a scarce resource, thereby encouraging the economic development of 
the resource. In so doing, apportionment institutions clearly advantage those 
actors who gain shares of the apportionment, creating a constituency with a 
strong interest in perpetuating the institution. In many semi-arid river basins, 
for instance, apportionments exist both between the riparian governments and 
within each of the riparian jurisdictions, creating vested interests on multiple 
governance levels. So, any effort to undertake major reforms of apportionment 
institutions must run a gauntlet of vested interests both at the domestic and 
basin levels, raising the difficulty and cost of reform and reinforcing the 
institutional status quo.
2. Network effects – Apportionment institutions also provide positive feedback 
to actors apart from the material benefits they confer on vested interests. When 
apportionment occurs on multiple governance levels – between jurisdictions 
and between water users within each jurisdiction – a network of functionally 
integrated rules is created. This integration is important because it becomes 
quite difficult to undertake reforms to some apportionment rules without 
undertaking reforms to the entire institutional network, substantially raising 
the costs of any reform. This is referred to as a network effect. For instance, 
in semi-arid river basins, intergovernmental apportionments cannot be rolled 
back without also undertaking major reforms of domestic water entitlement 
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systems. Due to this network effect, the difficulty and cost of institutional 
reform increases greatly, thereby providing a source of positive feedback and 
contributing to path dependency.
3. Sunk costs (Stranded assets) – Over time, governments and water users have 
not only made investments in the apportionment rules themselves, but also in 
extensive water management infrastructure to facilitate the implementation 
of these rules. This infrastructure variously includes dams, weirs, canals, 
pipelines, hydro-electricity generating facilities and irrigation projects, 
often funded with public money and carrying price tags into the billions of 
dollars. Institutional reforms resulting in apportionment roll backs would 
make at least some of this infrastructure redundant, stranding these assets 
and abandoning massive investments (Glenn 1999; Lloyd 1988; Reisner 
1993). The reluctance to abandon these sunk costs is a significant source of 
positive feedback, contributing to the overall resilience of apportionment 
institutions.
4. Formal/Informal contracts – Although their legal status varies from place to 
place, the water entitlements created by apportionment institutions can be 
difficult to reform due to their contractual nature. In some places, such as 
Australia and western Canada, water entitlements are granted by the state 
and constitute an informal contract between the state and license-holders. 
Although the state has the authority to alter the terms of this contract, there 
is an expectation that the licenses are semi-permanent and this is usually 
respected (Percy 2005, 2094–2095). In other places, such as the western 
US, water entitlements constitute a formal property right with judicial 
enforcement, making them quite difficult to reform (Tarlock 2001, 276–278). 
Whether formal or informal, the contractual nature of water entitlements 
adds to the cost of institutional change, providing an additional source of 
positive feedback from apportionment institutions and contributing to path 
dependency.
While vested interests, network effects, sunk costs and the contractual nature 
of water entitlements have been the main sources of positive feedback and path 
dependency for apportionment institutions in the cases examined in this paper, 
institutions in other common pool situations may have other distinctive sources 
of positive feedback. The objective here is not to provide an exhaustive list of 
positive feedback sources, but to show that path dependency can be important in 
shaping and constraining collective action efforts in common pool management. 
Path dependency comes into play when there is sufficient positive feedback – 
from one or more sources – to make an institution so politically entrenched that 
there is a “lock in” effect in which it is very difficult to deviate from the path set 
by the established institution (North 1990, 94). When this occurs, the range of 
viable future reform options is considerably narrowed so that early institutional 
choices cast a long shadow on subsequent collective action efforts.
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3. Path dependency in three semi-arid river basins
In the remainder of this article, the impact of path dependency on current water 
conservation efforts in three semi-arid river basins is examined in more detail. 
These basins include the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, the Colorado Basin in 
the United States, and the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin in Canada. In accordance 
with the ‘most different’ comparative approach taken in this paper, these cases were 
selected to show that the ‘apportionment to conservation’ development path – and 
path dependency – is not unique to one region, but is common across different 
parts of the world. The analysis focuses on basin-wide collective action efforts 
in water management, often between sub-national governments and sometimes 
within national governments. Given that there is no ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ collective 
action situation in common pool governance, this focus on large-scale collective 
action is meant to be illustrative rather than representative and was done primarily 
for ease of data collection. Future research will have to determine if the substantial 
impact of path dependency evident in the basin level collective action efforts 
described below is as prevalent at smaller and larger scales.
3.1. Murray-Darling Basin
The Murray-Darling Basin is located in south-eastern Australia and covers parts 
of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and the Australian 
Capital Territory. The source of the basin is in the Great Dividing Range in the east, 
its rivers flowing westward until they ultimately converge in the River Murray, 
eventually emptying into the Indian Ocean southeast of Adelaide. The Murray-
Darling is the most productive agricultural area of Australia, and irrigation plays a 
major role in this productivity. Crops such as hay, wheat, rice, stone fruits, citrus, 
and wine grapes are grown across the basin, and all but the former would not 
be possible without irrigation (Murray-Darling Basin Commission 2008). While 
irrigated agriculture is by far the largest user of water in the Murray-Darling, 
the basin is also the source of domestic water for two of the country’s largest 
cities, Canberra and Adelaide (Murray-Darling Basin Commission 2008). The 
flows of the Murray-Darling tend to be quite variable, and, from its early days of 
development, this has created basin-wide scarcity problems that have threatened 
economic development.
In the Murray-Darling, basin-wide water management has taken place 
mostly through sub-national cooperation. Under the Australian Constitution, 
water management was left primarily to the states; section 51(I) gave the 
Commonwealth a role in protecting the River Murray as a trade and transportation 
link, but section 100 limited this power by specifically protecting irrigation 
rights from Commonwealth impairment (Wright 1975, 170). Periodically, the 
Commonwealth government used its substantial spending power to get involved 
in water management issues, through the funding of dam construction or the 
offering of financial incentives for state water reforms, but the states have been the 
main water managers. Very recently, in response to an unprecedented multi-year 
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drought, the Commonwealth government has taken on a larger water management 
role in the Murray-Darling than it has had in the past, but it is unclear whether this 
will continue when the drought finally breaks.
During the federation debates in the last decade of the 19th century, control of 
the River Murray was one of the most contentious issues addressed, and it remained 
largely unresolved until an interstate apportionment was finally negotiated in the 
River Murray Waters Agreement of 1914. Negotiation of this apportionment was 
motivated by a severe drought in the early 1900s as well as the Commonwealth 
government’s willingness to come forward with funds for the construction of a 
series of dams and weirs that would facilitate navigation on the river and allow 
for some water storage and release capacity to meet state allocations (Wright 
1975; Wright 1978). The apportionment itself was quite complex, but had three 
essential features: 1) New South Wales and Victoria would divide the Murray 
waters upstream of Albury equally between them; 2) New South Wales and 
Victoria had full use of the Murray tributaries downstream from Albury; but, 
3) New South Wales and Victoria had to guarantee downstream South Australia 
a minimum annual allocation of 1,254,000 acre-feet, distributed in monthly 
installments to support irrigation (Wright 1975, 175). An intergovernmental 
organisation comprised of representatives from the three Murray states and the 
Commonwealth – the River Murray Commission – was also created to construct 
and operate the dams and weirs on the main stem of the Murray and to administer 
the apportionment on behalf of the states (Johnson 1974, 284).
In short order, the River Murray Waters Agreement became one of the 
institutional foundations of water development in the Murray-Darling. Using 
their respective apportionments, the states allocated water licenses, embarked on 
expansive programmes of irrigation development, and, in partnership with the 
Commonwealth, constructed a massive water control and storage infrastructure 
that included engineering marvels such as the Snowy Waters Project (Wigmore 
1968). By the 1960s, South Australia reached the objective of “full development” 
– putting all of its allocation to economic use – and New South Wales and 
Victoria were not far behind (Cooper 1985, 104–107; Alvarez, pers. comm.; 
Fitzpatrick, pers. comm.). Over time, the established apportionment institution 
provided increasing levels of positive feedback for key political actors in the 
basin: vested governmental and private interests benefited from established 
water apportionments; intergovernmental apportionments became intertwined 
with domestic water entitlements, creating a dense network of institutional rules; 
investments in physical infrastructure resulted in substantial sunk costs; and, the 
contractual nature of the apportionments made them difficult to reform in political 
processes. All of this positive feedback combined to make the early apportionment 
institution in the Murray-Darling politically unassailable, even as the dysfunctions 
of this institution became increasingly evident.
By the 1980s, it became widely apparent that full development was creating 
severe environmental problems in many parts of the basin, and that a basin-wide 
water conservation effort was seriously needed. A drought in the early 1980s 
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brought the Murray-Darling governments together and resulted in the creation 
of the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council in 1986, focusing high-level 
political attention on the environmental problems in the basin (Powell 1993, 
77–78). Then, in 1991, poor water quality and diminished flows on the Darling 
River led to a 1,000 km long blue-green algae bloom, killing scores of fish and 
making the river toxic to animals and humans. During the same period, diminished 
flows on the River Murray led to the closing of the Murray Mouth, separating the 
river from its outlet in the Indian Ocean, and forcing governments to bring in 
excavation equipment to reconnect them. This combination of political attention 
and environmental crises created a situation conducive to conservation reforms, 
and the most significant of these reforms was achieved in 1995 with the negotiation 
of the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions.
However, the design of the Murray-Darling Cap on Diversions was greatly 
constrained and influenced by the longstanding apportionment institution in the 
basin. Despite evident environmental problems, abandonment of the River Murray 
Waters Agreement was not on the table. Consequently, the Cap did not replace the 
River Murray Waters Agreement but was grafted onto it. This not only meant that 
the apportionment institution was largely preserved, but the new conservation 
institution took on some of its characteristics as new rules were added to old. One 
illustration of this is the apportionment-like manner in which the Cap sets out its 
conservation objectives. Under the Cap, Murray-Darling governments commit 
themselves to limiting water diversions in any given year to a level congruent 
with 1993/94 levels of development1, effectively establishing state water 
allocation ceilings to complement the state water allocation floors outlined in the 
River Murray Waters Agreement (Close and Connell 2000). In this way, the Cap 
is shaped and, to a large extent, incorporated into the established apportionment, 
a clear illustration of path dependent water governance.
Subsequent conservation efforts have also reflected this path dependency, 
particularly in efforts to restore water flows in the Murray and Snowy Rivers. In 
these rivers, conservation efforts have focused on government buybacks of water 
licenses and changes in dam management practices, both of which are compatible 
with the maintenance of the apportionment status quo. The continued resilience 
of the apportionment institution is all the more remarkable in the context of the 
current drought and recent efforts by the Commonwealth to take over substantial 
water management authority in the Murray-Darling. This institutional resilience, 
along with the path dependency of Murray-Darling water management in general, 
suggests that the conservation options available to the Commonwealth may be 
seriously constrained and the transfer of water management responsibility to the 
1
 More specifically, the Cap is defined “…in any year as the volume of water that would have been 
used with the infrastructure (pumps, dams, channels, areas developed for irrigation, etc.) and man-
agement rules that existed in 1993/94, assuming similar climatic and hydrologic conditions to those 
experienced in the year in question. Thus, the Cap provides scope for greater water use in certain 
years and lower use in other years.”
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federal government may not be the conservation panacea that many are hoping 
for (Connell 2007).
3.2. The Colorado River Basin
The Colorado is one of the most economically important rivers of the American 
West. From its source in the Rocky Mountains to its delta in the Gulf of California, 
the Colorado Basin encompasses seven states – Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New 
Mexico, Nevada, Arizona and California – as well as part of Mexico, and users 
in all these jurisdictions have placed heavy demands on the basin’s waters. The 
primary use of the Colorado is irrigated agriculture, though demand from domestic 
and industrial users in cities like Los Angeles, Phoenix and Las Vegas continues 
to grow and may eventually displace irrigation as the dominant use. Like the 
Murray-Darling, the Colorado Basin has highly variable flows and is among the 
most highly developed in the world in terms of dams and water storages, helping 
to mitigate scarcity problems during low flow periods and encouraging economic 
growth (Reisner 1993, 120–121). Given its endemic water scarcity and the 
continually growing demands on the basin, the Colorado has had plenty of water 
management problems and was one of the earliest basins in the United States to 
develop an interstate water apportionment institution.
Historically, the federal government, the state governments, and the courts 
have all played important roles in the management of the Colorado Basin. Federal 
jurisdiction in the Colorado and other transboundary waters is constitutionally 
related to its powers over interstate commerce and the management of public 
lands, and because federal laws in the US supersede state laws, Congress has been 
able to promulgate rules for the management of the Colorado (Getches 2001, 6). 
In addition, the federal government has been heavily involved in building and 
operating dozens of major dams and diversions throughout the Colorado Basin, and 
this involvement has given them a major role in the basin’s management through 
their discretion over water storage and release (Tarlock 2001, 771). Interstate 
water conflicts have also been frequently brought to the US courts for resolution 
and there is a well-established body of jurisprudence on these issues, making 
the courts a viable alternative to collective action, notwithstanding the time and 
money involved in lengthy litigation. Nevertheless, the state governments have 
remained the primary regulators of water withdrawals and the main distributors of 
water entitlements in the US, giving them formative roles in water management. 
When interstate cooperation has been pursued it has usually been in the form of 
interstate compacts, a type of legally enforceable intergovernmental agreement 
unique to American federalism that also requires the approval of Congress 
(Florestano 1994).
The first basin-wide water management institution in the Colorado Basin was 
the Colorado River Compact of 1922, an apportionment agreement negotiated 
between the seven riparian governments and approved by Congress. The 
motivating factor for the negotiation of the Compact was California’s growing 
Path dependency and collective action in common pool governance  141
demand for Colorado River water and concerns from other basin states that 
California would lay claim to most of the basin’s water before they could capture 
and develop resource flows for themselves (Reisner 1993, 124–125). After some 
difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached by dividing the river at Lee’s 
Ferry, Arizona into an upper basin (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico) and a 
lower basin (Nevada, Arizona, California), the division being politically expedient 
but hydrologically arbitrary. The upper and lower basins were each allocated 7.5 
million acre-feet of Colorado water to be divided among their respective states, at 
a later date. Though this eased the fears of upper basin states, it did little to appease 
Arizona who was grouped together with California in the lower basin and feared 
future encroachment on their water. Arizona’s dissatisfaction with the Compact 
was so deep that it did not actually ratify it until 1944, twenty-two years after the 
other riparian governments, and then only because its ratification was linked to 
the passage of the Central Arizona Project in the US Congress (Gelt 1997).
The final apportionment of the Colorado was not actually accomplished 
until forty years after it was initiated, and then only after a period of protracted 
intergovernmental negotiations and litigation. In 1948, the upper basin states, 
where water development was still relatively nascent, negotiated a precise 
interstate apportionment of the upper basin waters, allocating 51.7% to Colorado, 
23% to Utah, 14% to Wyoming, and 11.25% to New Mexico (Gelt 1997). The 
lower basin states, however, had their apportionment settled in the courts. In 
1963, the Supreme Court ruled in Arizona v. California that the lower basin would 
be apportioned so that California would receive 4.4 million acre-feet, Arizona 
2.8 million acre-feet and Nevada 300,000 acre-feet from the main stem of the 
Colorado, and each state would be entitled to its own tributaries. The ruling also 
allowed the federal Secretary of the Interior to act as water master on the Lower 
Colorado due to the federal water control works at Boulder Canyon, which were 
crucial to the apportionment’s implementation (Gelt 1997). Since the Arizona v. 
California ruling, controversies have arisen over California’s tendency to take 
more than its allotted allocation, even in recent years, but the apportionment has 
remained intact (Davis 2001, 533).
The apportionment issue was crucial to the riparian states because extensive 
programmes of agricultural and urban development were predicated upon access to 
Colorado flows. While California had the earliest and most extensive development 
programme, the other states have followed suit in their own ways, particularly in 
Arizona and Nevada where some of the fastest growing urban areas in the US 
are now located. A crucial part of these state development programmes was the 
extensive distribution of water rights to irrigators and landowners, the security of 
these rights largely dependent on the availability of Colorado flows. Overall, due 
to massive public and private water investment, the creation of water-dependent 
vested interests, and the institutional intertwining of the interstate apportionment 
with state water entitlement systems, the Colorado interstate apportionment 
institution became politically unassailable and essentially “locked in”. This has 
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made basin-wide water management strongly path dependent in the Colorado, 
shaping conservation efforts in the basin when they were eventually undertaken.
When the initial Colorado apportionment was made in 1922, it was based 
on data from the federal Bureau of Reclamation which showed average annual 
flows on the Colorado to be in excess of 15 million acre-feet. Subsequent data 
suggested, however, that average annual flows are probably much less than this, 
creating a serious over-allocation problem in the basin (Gelt 1997). This over-
allocation has impaired the resource stock so that, in many years, very little 
Colorado water actually reaches Mexico, the water that does get through is highly 
saline, and the riverine environment has deteriorated significantly. However, 
due to the vested state interests in the current apportionment institution and the 
extensive water development programmes that have grown up around it, the 
apportionment institution has proven quite resilient and more recent conservation 
efforts have been moulded around the established apportionment. Furthermore, 
the states are so heavily invested in the apportionment that interstate cooperation 
on conservation has been minimal and all of the major conservation reforms have 
been introduced, instead, at the federal level.
Over the last three and a half decades, Congress has passed a plethora of 
laws to facilitate basin-wide water conservation in the Colorado Basin. Some of 
these laws are specific to the Colorado while others are more general. The most 
important pieces of general legislation date from the early 1970s and include the 
Clean Water Act, Federal Land Policy and Management Act, National Forest 
Management Act and Endangered Species Act (Getches 2001, 15–16). Specific 
to the Colorado Basin are the 1974 Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act 
and the 1992 Grand Canyon Protection Act (Gelt 1997). Although none of these 
pieces of federal legislation have canceled or altered the apportionment institution 
itself, they have incrementally added to the ‘Law of the River,’ constraining 
how states use their respective allocations and providing direction to the federal 
administrators managing the storage and release of water in the basin, all with 
the view of attaining conservation objectives. In some cases, for instance, this 
has meant leaving more water in the river to protect endangered species and 
environmentally sensitive areas, creating serious tensions with established state 
and private water allocations. In short, the apportionment institution persists with 
federal conservation laws operating at its margins.
The overall result in the Colorado River Basin is path dependent water 
management in which conservation rules have been shaped by early apportionment 
rules. The continued prevalence of apportionment is explained by the resilience of 
the apportionment rules, in which the riparian states invested a lot of negotiation 
and litigation over a number of decades, and which form the basis for the 
extensive economic development that is still taking place in the US Southwest. 
The more recent conservation rules were developed in response to deteriorating 
environmental conditions in the basin – created, in part, by the apportionment 
institution – and were only possible due to the presence of Congress as an 
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alternative venue for collective action in the US federal system. The addition of 
conservation laws to the existing apportionment institution has created a number 
of tensions between these divergent institutions, and it remains to be seen how 
these tensions will be resolved as cities and water demands continue to grow, 
particularly in the lower part of the basin.
3.3. The Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin
The Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin in western Canada has its source in the Rocky 
Mountains and flows eastward through the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba before draining into Hudson’s Bay. The largest consumptive use 
of Saskatchewan-Nelson water is irrigated agriculture, particularly in the semi-
arid areas of southern Alberta and southern Saskatchewan, though hydro-electric 
generation, oil extraction, manufacturing, and domestic consumption also figure 
prominently in different regions. The basin’s flows are variable, but a spate of dam 
and storage construction in the mid 20th century – though not on the scale of the 
Murray-Darling or the Colorado – have helped to mitigate this variability for water 
users and assisted the riparian governments in managing their interdependencies 
(Glenn 1999, 15).
Like the Murray-Darling, basin-wide water management in the Saskatchewan-
Nelson has been largely left to inter-provincial cooperation. Although the 
federal government has jurisdiction over fisheries, navigation and shipping, and 
international waters under the Constitution Act, 1867, the provinces regulate 
most water withdrawals within their borders and the federal government 
remains reluctant to challenge this authority when it comes to inter-provincial 
rivers (Kennett 1991; Saunders 1988). Past conflicts over the control of natural 
resources have caused the provinces, particularly Alberta, to guard closely their 
jurisdiction over natural resources, and, in the interest of national unity, Ottawa 
has generally respected this. This is the case even though there may be grounds for 
federal intervention in inter-provincial waters under the “peace, order and good 
government” clause in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (Saunders and 
Wenig 2007, 122–123). Overall, by virtue of constitutional and political factors, 
management of the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin has been an inter-provincial 
affair, with low-level federal consultation and involvement.
Due to concerns from downstream Saskatchewan and Manitoba that water 
development in upstream Alberta could leave them with diminished water flows, 
apportionment became a central issue in early efforts at basin-wide collective 
action. Apportionment was first addressed with the formation of the inter-
provincial Western Water Board in 1930, which was eventually transformed into 
the Prairie Provinces Water Board in 1948. Initially, the Prairie Provinces Water 
Board was created as an advisor on apportionment, “… to recommend the best use 
of the waters of the Saskatchewan River system, and how it should be allocated 
amongst the provinces” (Glenn 1999, 14). “This method worked well until the 
1960s, when the provinces began requesting large allocations of water. Since the 
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approach used by the Board was no longer adequate to allow long-term planning 
by the provinces, a new system for sharing this limited resource was developed” 
(Prairie Provinces Water Board 2007). The new system involved clear and formal 
apportionment rules for the waters of the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin, outlined 
in the Master Apportionment Agreement of 1969 and overseen by the Prairie 
Provinces Water Board.
Negotiated between the three Prairie provinces and facilitated by the federal 
government, the Master Apportionment Agreement divided the Saskatchewan-
Nelson’s waters so that “… Alberta and Saskatchewan may each take up to one 
half of the natural flow of water originating within its boundaries and one half of 
the flow entering the province. The remainder is left to flow into Manitoba” (Prairie 
Provinces Water Board 2007). This apportionment was designed to provide the 
provinces with relatively equal shares of the basin, and each province was left to 
develop and manage its share at its own discretion (Prairie Provinces Water Board 
2007). The Prairie Provinces Water Board was assigned the task of monitoring 
the apportionment and remained a forum for intergovernmental coordination and 
information sharing, but had no authority to enforce the agreement.
Over time, the Master Agreement on Apportionment has become a key 
institution for water development in the Canadian Prairies. In southern Alberta, 
and to a lesser extent in southern Saskatchewan, governments and irrigators have 
invested heavily in dams and other irrigation infrastructure, expanding water 
use to the limits of their respective apportionments. This not only resulted in 
substantial sunk costs in the apportionment but created politically powerful vested 
interests to defend it, particularly in Alberta where the Progressive Conservative 
party has ruled consecutively since 1971 based largely on the support of the 
province’s rural ridings. In addition, the provincial water entitlement systems 
have become dependent on the preservation of the apportionments and the two 
have become institutionally intertwined, as a result. This combination of sunk 
costs, vested interests, and institutional network effects has resulted in the “lock-
in” of the Master Agreement on Apportionment, as evidenced by the fact that no 
serious effort has been launched to reform the provincial apportionments since its 
introduction.
Yet, while the apportionment institution was becoming increasingly entrenched, 
water conservation issues also began to emerge. As the waters of the basin were 
increasingly appropriated, water quality deteriorated and some fish stocks went 
into decline (Glenn 1999). By the mid 1980s, the basin’s water was so heavily 
used in its upper reaches that Alberta came close to exceeding its apportionment 
on the South Saskatchewan River in 1984, 1985 and 1988, and actually exceeded 
its apportionment on some smaller rivers in a number of years around this time 
(Environment Canada 2002, 5; Figliuzzi 2002, 13).
However, the established apportionment has proven so resilient that all 
basin-wide conservation measures have been added to its margins, rather than 
reforming its core. In 1992, for instance, the Master Apportionment Agreement 
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was amended to include a new Agreement on Water Quality that established water 
quality objectives for various parts of the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin, to be 
monitored, but not enforced, by the Prairie Provinces Water Board (Environment 
Canada 2002, 5). Provincially, the Alberta and Saskatchewan governments have 
also reformed some of their water management practices in the 1990s and early 
2000s to achieve a variety of water conservation objectives, but not on a basin-
wide level (Percy 2005). None of these intergovernmental or provincial reforms 
has altered the basic features of the established apportionment institution, which 
continues as it was, and, indeed, remains so influential that it constrains the range 
of viable options for water conservation in the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin.
4. Conclusions
Among the cases examined in this article, the political resilience of early 
apportionment institutions has been universal, manifesting itself as path dependent 
water governance in three ways. First, in all three cases, collective action efforts to 
adopt conservation institutions were inhibited and delayed for fear that conservation 
rules might undermine the apportionment institutions in which governments and 
resource users were heavily invested. Second, when conservation institutions 
were eventually adopted, the apportionment institutions were not only preserved, 
but the conservation rules were built around the apportionments to ensure their 
preservation. Third, at least one of the conservation institutions – the Murray-
Darling Cap – took on design characteristics of the established apportionment 
institution, creating conservation rules with distinctive apportionment-like 
features.
Altogether, these findings lead to the general conclusion that path dependency 
can be an important factor influencing collective action in common pool 
governance, particularly in common pools with a long history of collective 
action. These findings also suggest that path dependency is particularly relevant in 
common pools characterised by the ‘apportionment to conservation’ development 
path, where early efforts at collective action focused on the apportionment of 
resource flows and were only later directed to the conservation of resource stocks. 
The resilience of early apportionment institutions can make them very difficult 
to displace when serious conservation concerns emerge later on, constraining the 
development of much-needed conservation initiatives. Thus, in many common 
pools, institutional legacies may be just as important as the knowledge, preferences 
and mutual trust of current actors in determining the outcomes of collective action 
efforts.
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